讲座题目：Allocating Emission Permits Efficiently via Uniform Linear Mechanisms

讲座时间：2023年9月14日（周四）14：00

讲座地点：明德楼1101会议室

主讲嘉宾：鲁家琦助理教授 香港中文大学（深圳）

主讲嘉宾简介：

鲁家琦现为香港中文大学（深圳）助理教授。鲁家琦于2013年获清华大学工业工程及英语双学士学位。之后，她前往哥伦比亚大学深造，并于2015年获得哥伦比亚大学管理科学与工程硕士学位；于2021年获得决策风险及运营博士学位。她的研究使用博弈论、优化理论、随机建模以及统计物理学来分析解决企业和社会中的复杂运营问题。具体方向包括匹配市场的分析、优化和设计以及库存管理。

讲座主要内容：

We study the problem of allocating emission permits in an emissions trading system and provide efficiency guarantee of simple uniform linear allocation mechanisms in the broad class of component-wise concave mechanisms. It was well accepted in the literature that the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are not affected by the initial allocation of emission permits in a deterministic system without trading fractions. However, the initial allocations previously considered were largely restricted to constant ones that do not depend on the firms’current production decisions. We show that, by allowing more general mechanisms that are component-wise concave in the firm’s production decision, which capture many realistic allocation rules including lump-sum allocations (such as grandfathering), output-based allocations (either top-down or bottom-up), etc., consumer surplus will no longer be independent of the initial allocations. In particular, for N firms operating under Cournot competition that differs in their abatement abilities, uniform linear permit allocation mechanisms are the most efficient, i.e., achieve the maximum equilibrium aggregate production output given the same level of equilibrium emission, hence the maximum consumer surplus. By defining a monopoly’s problem that is equivalent to the original N-firm system, the regulator can thus reduce the search space of N-dimensional allocation mechanisms to a single coefficient. Numerical experiments show that the benefit of uniform linear mechanisms compared to constant ones can be large.

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